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NO. 50 NOVEMBER 2018 Introduction 
Shadows over the European Elections 
Three Scenarios for EU-sceptical Parties after the 2019 Elections 
Nicolai von Ondarza and Felix Schenuit 
For a long time, the elections to the European Parliament (EP) were considered second-
order elections with little political significance. But for the elections coming in 2019, 
they are turning into a decisive vote on the future of the European Union (EU) – not 
only because the EP has gained in importance, but especially because the European 
party system is undergoing fundamental change. Whereas established parties are 
losing support, right-wing populist and EU-sceptical parties have been growing across 
Europe. At the same time, there are increased efforts to unite the traditionally frag-
mented EU-sceptical forces into a collective movement. Even though there is no dras-
tic increase expected in the number of EU-sceptical Members of European Parliament 
(MEPs) in the next parliamentary term, a reorganisation of the EU-sceptical spectrum 
could be the prelude to drastic changes in the political structure of the EU. 
 
Traditionally, the European election year 
is regarded in Brussels as a “year of institu-
tional transition”. From the start of the EP 
election campaigns in the spring, all the 
way up to the planned election of the new 
Commission, most of the year is devoted to 
this transition. Since the Treaty of Lisbon 
and the introduction of the Spitzenkandida-
ten principle in 2014, the Presidency of the 
Commission is also directly linked to the 
elections. In addition, the Parliament has to 
approve the entire Commission, including 
the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign and Security Policy. As the term 
limit of the European Council President 
also expires in November 2019, the entire 
leadership of the EU will be renewed. 
At the level of the member states, how-
ever, the EP vote has so far been little more 
than “second-order elections”, a series of 
simultaneous national votes that serve, 
above all, to send a message to the respec-
tive national governments. European politi-
cal issues, on the other hand, have played 
only a minor role in previous EP election 
campaigns. 
In 2019, however, the elections will take 
place under changed circumstances. After 
almost a decade of “crisis mode”, the future 
development of the EU is more contro-
versial than ever. In March 2019, just eight 
weeks before the European elections, the 
United Kingdom will (probably) be the first 
member to leave the EU. As a result, the 
EP will, for the first time, be comprised of 
fewer MEPs than before: only 705 (see SWP 
Comment 10/2018). More than six months 
before the elections, candidates for the 
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Spitzenkandidaten are also pushing their way 
into the European public arena – even 
earlier than in the last elections. 
At the same time, party systems across 
Europe are changing, albeit in varying 
degrees: In almost all elections since 2014, 
established parties have lost support, where-
as the levels of fragmentation of party sys-
tems and the share of votes cast by EU-
sceptical parties have grown in many cases. 
But liberal, pro-European forces also have a 
figurehead who is outside the existing party 
spectrum: French President Emmanuel 
Macron. 
This makes the European elections a 
challenge for the EU’s political system. On 
the one hand, the informal “grand coali-
tion” between the Christian democratic and 
conservative European People’s Party (EPP) 
and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
& Democrats (S&D), which traditionally 
dominates the EU, must for the first time 
fear for its majority in the EP. On the other 
hand, Matteo Salvini, chairman of the 
Italian Lega Nord, and Stephen Bannon, 
right-wing populist agitator from the 
United States, have formulated the goal 
of uniting EU-sceptical parties and making 
them the largest faction in the EP. 
European Parties: Between 
Alliances of Convenience and 
Genuine Communities of Interest 
In principle, European parties cannot be 
equated with national parties in terms of 
organisational character, unifying effect, 
and assertiveness. The Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) recognises parties at the Euro-
pean level that “contribute to forming 
European political awareness and to ex-
pressing the will of citizens of the Union” 
(Article 10, TEU) and party financing struc-
tures have been established. However, Euro-
pean parties are not associations of citizens, 
but umbrella organisations of national par-
ties. So far, they have been much weaker 
than their national member parties in 
terms of election campaigns, programmes, 
and finances. They are mainly visible 
through the work of their EP political 
groups. Nevertheless, they fulfil four impor-
tant functions in the EU’s political system. 
Firstly, they play a quite considerable 
role in reconciling the interests of national 
parties, and thus serve as an integration 
factor in European politics. For instance, 
the heads of state and government and/or 
party leaders of the large party families, 
such as the European Peoples Party (EPP) 
or the Party for European Socialists (PES), 
coordinate themselves before each Euro-
pean Council. There is, of course, also con-
tinuous coordination among the party 
groups in the EP, which often have close 
links to their national parties. 
Secondly, the European political parties 
and their parliamentary groups are the 
main players for obtaining a majority in 
the EP, where there is no formal coalition, 
meaning that majorities must always be 
established on a case-by-case basis. Here, 
the party groups act like coherent political 
players. Despite their character as umbrella 
organisations, the major parties in particu-
lar have, with a few exceptions, succeeded 
in establishing parliamentary discipline in 
the EP instead of voting along national lines. 
Thirdly, the parties are also becoming 
increasingly important for filling top EU 
positions. This has become clear in the 
strengthening of the EP through the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the Spitzenkandidaten principle, 
which was applied for the first time in 2014. 
Filling the posts of the European Council 
President and the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign and Security Policy 
has also been linked to proportional rep-
resentation of the parties. 
Fourthly, European parties and joint 
parliamentary groups in the EP offer addi-
tional resources and legitimacy for national 
parties. Paradoxically, it was precisely the 
EU-sceptical parties that benefited the most 
from the EP’s financial resources and the 
stage it provided. For instance, both Nigel 
Farage and Marine Le Pen used their 
speeches in the European Parliament to 
gather social media attention, and used 
their legitimacy as MEPs to take part in 
televised debates, despite neither having 
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won a seat in their national Parliament at 
the time. 
EU-sceptical Parties in Strasbourg 
The size and composition of the EU-scep-
tical camp, which is still the most frag-
mented one in the EP, are critical compo-
nents in determining the composition and 
direction of the next European Parliament. 
In the summer of 2018, Stephen Bannon, 
former advisor to US President Donald 
Trump, announced building a movement 
to support right-wing populist parties 
across Europe. The declared goal is to form 
a large right-wing populist group with up to 
one-third of the MEPs in the 2019 European 
elections – thereby weakening the liberal 
European order from within. 
Even though Bannon’s proposal generated 
significant media attention, it should be 
noted that he jumped on an already mov-
ing train: Even before the European elec-
tions in 2014, the French National Front, 
the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the 
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), and the 
Italian Lega Nord had agreed on right-wing 
populist cooperation. After these four had 
performed worse than expected in the 
2014 elections, they formed the Europe 
of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group the 
following year. In 2017, the leaders of the 
above parties, plus the German Alternative 
for Germany (AfD), met in Koblenz to sup-
port each other in the ongoing election cam-
paigns and to push for policy changes in 
Europe. The objective is clearly stated: 
Salvini, party leader of Lega Nord, wants to 
create a European alliance to unite all EU-
sceptical, national-conservative, and right-
wing populist movements in Europe and to 
close the borders of the EU. It is a substan-
tial challenge for the existing order in the 
Union. 
So far, the spectrum of EU-sceptical par-
ties in the European party system ranges 
from those that are moderately critical of 
the EU to the anti-EU parties of right-wing 
populists, and even those with a right-wing 
extremist character. These currents have 
been represented at the European level for 
some time. Already in the first direct elec-
tions in 1979, a handful of Eurosceptic 
MEPs were elected to the EP, followed in 
1984 by the then still clearly right-wing 
extremist Front National. Since the desired 
“national international” per se contains a 
contradiction, the parties concerned have 
long failed to establish a stable European 
group or party that can survive several legis-
lative periods. In the 2014 European elec-
tions, the number of EU-sceptical MEPs rose 
to such an extent that they were able to 
form three separate parliamentary groups. 
EU-sceptical Factions and 
Parliamentarians 
The largest of these three is the European 
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group. 
It currently has 73 members from 19 EU 
member states. In addition to its liberal 
economic orientation, the ECR originally 
followed a moderately EU-sceptical model. 
Accordingly, the majority of its members 
supported the membership of their coun-
tries in the EU, but they called for returning 
to a focus on the internal market and inter-
governmental decision-making procedures. 
Since 2016 at the latest, however, the UK 
Conservatives, who have dominated the 
ECR, have been advocating for Brexit. At 
the same time, the group has expanded to 
include MEPs who are more sceptical about 
the EU. These include the Sweden Demo-
crats, who are in favour of an EU exit refer-
endum. However, the course of the Brexit 
negotiations have made it clear that Brexit 
also threatens the future of the ECR: With 
the Conservatives leaving the EP, the Polish 
Law and Justice (PiS) party remains the only 
large party within the ECR. 
Even more uncertain is the future of the 
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy 
(EFDD) group, the second smallest group in 
the EP, with 42 MEPs. It was formed after 
the 2014 elections and has no common 
electoral manifest. From the outset, it has 
been a mere alliance of convenience be-
tween the UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
and the Italian Five Star Movement. The 
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lowest common denominator has been the 
populist, EU-critical stance and the interest 
in parliamentary resources for political 
groups. With Brexit (most likely) happening 
at the end of March 2019, the 19 UKIP MEPs 
will exit the EP. This means that the EFDD 
would no longer be able to claim parlia-
mentary group status, at least before the 
European elections in 2019, because a 
necessary criterion – namely bringing to-
gether at least 25 MEPs – would no longer 
be fulfilled. In any case, the second pillar 
of the EFDD – the 14 MEPs of the Five Star 
Movement – is acting more like an inde-
pendent group than as a part of the EFDD, 
most recently since trying to join the Al-
liance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE) in 2017. In Italy, the party has – at 
least rhetorically – softened its EU-critical 
stance. The smaller parties in the EFDD 
should therefore reorient themselves after 
the European elections, at the latest. 
The ENF group has 35 MEPs, almost 
half of them from the French National Rally 
(Rassemblement National, formerly Front 
National). It is the smallest and youngest 
group in the EP. Its member parties are 
characterised by their strict rejection of the 
EU as a whole and also their right-wing 
populist to right-wing extremist positions. 
The ENF is the only one of the three groups 
in the EU-critical spectrum that is not sig-
nificantly affected by Brexit. Several repre-
sentatives of the parties in the ENF, such as 
former ENF MEP and current Italian Interior 
Minister Matteo Salvini, want to transform 
the ENF into a movement of EU-critical 
parties after the European elections. 
Finally, there are still 23 non-attached 
MEPs in the European Parliament, most 
of whom can be counted towards the EU-
sceptical spectrum. These include parlia-
mentarians from the National Democratic 
Party of Germany and the Hungarian Jobbik 
party, which have been judged to be so ex-
treme by their colleagues that, so far, none 
of the EU-sceptic groups have wanted to 
admit them. The future of the AfD in the 
EP is also in question – it can hope for a 
double-digit number of MEPs in view of its 
poll results and the many German parlia-
mentarians. In 2014, the AfD started with 
seven MEPs as part of the more moderate 
ECR group. After several internal party 
splits and exclusion from the ECR, only one 
AfD member is formally still represented in 
the EP and sits in the EFDD parliamentary 
group. A connection to the ENF is also 
being discussed in the party. 
Orbán and the Future of the EPP 
But the ambitions for a collective move-
ment are not limited to the existing EU-
sceptical factions: Salvini, among others, 
has invited Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán to join an EU-sceptical rally-
ing group. Orbán’s Fidesz party has been a 
member of the EPP since Hungary joined 
the EU. The EPP sees itself as a pro-Euro-
pean party that advocates values such as 
the rule of law, democracy, and the strength-
ening of civil society. Orbán, on the other 
hand, is pursuing his goal of an “illiberal 
democracy” in Hungary and has already 
had the freedom of the press and the activ-
ities of foreign non-governmental organi-
sations restricted. Orbán is increasingly 
sceptical about European integration in its 
current form and criticises the fact that it 
is interfering too deeply with national sover-
eignty. The AfD has declared both Salvini 
and Orbán, amongst others, as their “natu-
ral allies in Europe”. In terms of policies, 
there are overlaps between Orbáns Fidesz 
with EU-sceptical, right-wing populist par-
ties, especially in migration policy, but also 
with the growing levels of rejection of the 
current path of European integration. 
Until 2018, the EPP leadership had opted 
for dialogue and rejected EU legal proceed-
ings against Hungary. In September 2018, 
however, the majority of EPP MEPs voted 
in favour of initiating such proceedings 
against Hungary under Article 7 of the TEU, 
whereas the EU-sceptical groups ECR, EFDD, 
and ENF voted largely in favour of Fidesz. 
The EPP leadership and Fidesz stressed after 
the vote that the party would neither leave 
the EPP nor be excluded. However, Orbán 
publicly toyed with the idea of cooperating 
with national conservative forces. He under-
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pinned this idea during a meeting with 
the Lega Nord leader, Salvini, at which time 
they announced a joint “anti-migration 
front” and positioned themselves in the 
same ideological camp. In doing so, they 
clearly distinguished themselves from Presi-
dent Macron. The latter, in turn, attacked 
the EPP and stressed that one party could 
not be the political home of Angela Merkel 
and Viktor Orbán at the same time. 
Expected Changes in the 
EU-sceptical Spectrum 
The strength of EU-sceptical forces in the 
next European Parliament thus relies on 
two factors – how well the individual par-
ties do in the EP elections, and how well 
they are able to work together in the Par-
liament afterwards. 
Six months before the elections, the 
chances of success of the individual parties 
can only be inaccurately assessed by polls. 
The European elections, with their 27 
simultaneous national elections, are par-
ticularly susceptible to deviations in the 
polls, low turnouts, and changes in voters’ 
intentions. Moreover, very few EU countries 
have conducted meaningful surveys on the 
European elections so far. 
Our initial forecasts (see Figure 1, p. 6) 
of possible outcomes of the European elec-
tions show, however, that the ENF and 
the EFDD – in contrast to almost all other 
parliamentary groups – are expected to 
increase their share of seats. Apart from 
these two, only the ALDE can expect growth. 
Although the polls offer little more than a 
preliminary, cautious orientation, it is very 
likely that the informal “grand coalition” 
between the EPP and the S&D could lose its 
parliamentary majority for the first time 
since direct elections began in 1979. 
The ECR would suffer losses because of 
the departure of the UK Conservatives. The 
EPP and the S&D must both fear significant 
losses. The Greens/European Free Alliance 
(EFA) are currently polling very high in a 
few member states (Germany, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands), but are also expected to 
shrink overall. In addition, a number of 
new or hitherto non-attached parties are 
likely to enter Parliament. These include 
Macron’s La République En Marche! (LREM) 
party, which is expected to work with the 
ALDE group, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La 
France Insoumise (LFI) party, which is ex-
pected to join the European United Left–
Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). In addition, 
there are a number of new parties, most 
of which belong to the EU-sceptical party 
spectrum. Before and after the elections, 
intensive negotiations on the accession of, 
and changes in, political groups are to be 
expected. The results of these talks depend 
on both political and personal factors and 
can therefore hardly be predicted, but they 
will nevertheless have a considerable influ-
ence on the size of the respective parlia-
mentary groups. 
There is some evidence that the EU-scep-
tical spectrum will retain the same (high) 
level of seats – slightly more than 20 per 
cent – in the European Parliament after 
the elections and will not increase it. This 
may come as a surprise when one considers 
that EU-sceptical parties have gained popu-
larity in national elections in almost all EU 
member states since 2014. Apart from the 
fact that political reports pay significant 
attention to the right-wing populist parties, 
this forecast can be explained by two factors. 
On the one hand, the EU-sceptical spec-
trum is proportionally the most affected by 
Brexit, as the two largest groups of EU-scep-
tical MEPs to date (UKIP and UK Conserva-
tives) will be leaving the EP. On the other 
hand, some EU sceptics already achieved 
impressive successes in the 2014 European 
elections, predating their significant nation-
al successes since then. These include, for 
example, the French National Front, the 
Dutch PVV, and the Danish People’s Party. 
New gains for EU-sceptical parties in the 
2019 European elections can therefore be 
expected primarily from parties that had 
not achieved a breakthrough in 2014 but 
have since been successful at the national 
level. This applies, above all, to the Italian 
Lega Nord, the German AfD, partially the 
Austrian FPÖ, and the Sweden Democrats. 
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Compared to 2014, the fundamentally 
critical faction of the EU sceptics can there-
fore expect greater growth. 
Three Scenarios 
It remains open whether, and in which con-
stellation, the parties of the EU-sceptical 
spectrum will cooperate in the next Par-
liament. So far, as shown, they have been 
divided into three smaller groups and a 
number of non-attached MEPs, who by 
themselves have less influence than a larger 
group. For substantive reasons, there is 
little likelihood that cooperation will con-
tinue to be enforceable in the future. The 
votes in the course of the last parliamentary 
term reveal that only the ECR has achieved 
the status of a group being capable of 
acting with group discipline. 
There are also substantial differences 
between the EU-sceptical parties. This ap-
plies, above all, to three of their core politi-
cal issues. First, the parties have quite dif-
ferent stances towards the EU. The spec-
trum still ranges from moderate EU scep-
tics, who reject the depth of integration 
but want to retain the Union as such, to 
fundamental EU opponents, whose declared 
goal is to abolish the Union, or at least lead 
their country out of it. Secondly, the issue 
of migration is a matter of disagreement. 
Northern and Central European populists, 
for example, reject the distribution of refu-
gees, whereas Southern Europeans demand 
solidarity from their EU partners. Thirdly 
and finally, a “national international” suf-
fers from the fact that the emphasis on 
national identity and sovereignty contra-
dicts European cooperation. 
Yet, for reasons of power politics, there is 
a significant incentive for right-wing popu-
lists and EU-critical parties to symbolically 
underpin their strength after the European 
elections with a joint parliamentary group 
that is as large as possible. At the same 
time, this would give them even more op-
portunities to demand speaking rights in – 
and resources from – the EP. 
Three possible scenarios for the future 
development of the right-wing populist and 
EU-sceptical spectrum after the 2019 elec-
Figure 1 
Possible outcomes of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament 
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tions can be formulated from this mixed 
situation. Scenario A – a continuation of 
the status quo with the three fragmented 
factions – can almost be ruled out. The 
EFDD, in particular, has been nothing more 
than an alliance of convenience since it was 
founded and, during the course of the legis-
lative period, it has lost what few ties it had 
that bound it together. Without UKIP as the 
main pillar, the remaining parties will tend 
to turn to other political groups. The Five 
Star Movement from Italy will play a key 
role. As the second pillar alongside UKIP, it 
has already distanced itself in the current 
legislative period from the EFDD and partly 
from earlier anti-EU/euro rhetoric. In 2019 
it could again increase the number of its 
MEPs and become one of the largest national 
parties in the EP. 
In scenario B, the EU-sceptical camp 
would concentrate on two factions along 
the axis of EU scepticism. Accordingly, the 
EFDD would disappear, the ECR would take 
on the rather moderate EU-sceptical, eco-
nomically liberal parties, and the ENF 
would assemble the fundamentally EU-
sceptical, globalisation-critical parties 
within its ranks. In scenarios B and C, 
we have also included the projection that 
Macron’s LREM will cooperate with the 
ALDE, and Mélenchon’s LFI with the Euro-
pean Left (GUE/NGL). 
According to current forecasts, some 46 
EFDD seats would have to be reallocated. 
This would affect the AfD and the Five Star 
Movement, in particular. Currently, it 
seems most plausible that the AfD will join 
the ENF. The Five Star Movement, on the 
other hand, has recently weakened its 
EU-sceptical position and announced the 
founding of a new group after the 2019 
elections. However, it is still completely 
unclear whether – and with which part-
ners – this can succeed. If this does not 
succeed, the Five Star Movement would 
probably opt for no faction rather than 
forming a faction with Salvini in the ENF or 
strongly value-conservative parties such as 
the Polish PiS in the ECR. In scenarios B and 
C, it is therefore still assigned to the inde-
pendents. 
The ENF should fulfil the necessary 
condition of having 25 MEPs from at least 
seven member states. With parties such as 
the AfD, the French Rassemblement National, 
the FPÖ, and the PVV now firmly anchored 
in the national political system, the ENF 
would have a much more stable composi-
tion than before. However, a balance of 
power and common political goals would 
have to be found in such a group that is 
composed of strong parties from Italy, 
Austria, France, and Germany. This could 
be a great challenge for the parties, as some 
of them are dominated by individuals (Italy 
and France), or shaped by discussions about 
the political orientation, such as the AfD in 
Germany. 
Without the Conservatives from the UK, 
the ECR would have to reconstitute itself 
and would, in the future, be more strongly 
influenced by Central and Eastern Europe-
an national conservatives. But the group 
could continue to play its hybrid role, co-
operating with the EPP and ALDE on eco-
nomic issues, but adopting a more oppo-
sitional stance on issues of European policy 
and conservative values. 
For both groups, there would also be the 
potential for enlargement in the group of 
non-attached MEPs and new or as-of-yet 
unattached parties. Beyond the announce-
ment of the results, it therefore remains 
interesting to observe which camp could 
form the larger group in this scenario, the 
ECR or the ENF. In view of the current fore-
casts and the diversity of right-wing parties, 
scenario B seems to be the most plausible 
one at the moment. 
Finally, in scenario C, the parties in-
volved would – according to Salvini’s or 
Bannon’s declared goal – be able to form 
an EU-critical collective group uniting all 
parties of the EU-sceptical spectrum. 
According to Salvini’s vision, this should 
not only include the parties of the ECR, the 
EFDD, and the ENF, but also win the sup-
port of the right wing of the EPP, above all 
that of Viktor Orbán. 
In numerical terms, such a collective 
movement would certainly have the poten-
tial to become the largest, or second largest, 
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group in the EP. For this to happen, how-
ever, the serious political differences between 
these parties would have to be bridged. A 
taboo break would also be necessary with 
regard to cooperation between the previous 
right wing of the EPP, the ECR, and the 
tough opponents of the EU. Although this 
scenario cannot be completely ruled out, 
it is more likely that the ENF will become 
stronger and gradually try to poach parties 
from the ECR or EPP. It will also be inter-
esting to see whether parties considered to 
be clearly right-wing extremists will be in-
vited to become members of a collective 
faction. 
Outlook 
The scenarios illustrate what is at stake in 
the 2019 European elections. If the EU-scep-
tical camp remains as fragmented as before, 
Parliament’s work will remain largely un-
changed. A collective movement, on the 
other hand, would even have the chance to 
form the largest parliamentary group in the 
EP – though still be far from a parliamen-
tary majority. However, because the politi-
cal orientations of the EU-sceptical parties 
diverge greatly, it seems more realistic 
at the moment that two factions will be 
formed along the axis of EU scepticism and 
divide the parties assembled in the EFDD 
amongst the ECR and the ENF. 
The decisive factor will be the negotia-
tions on future party affiliations after the 
elections – not only between the parties 
already represented in Parliament, but also 
with the new ones. The election results 
alone will therefore hardly provide enough 
information about the majority situation in 
the next parliamentary term. Rather, it can 
be assumed that the parliamentary groups 
will change again and again in the course 
of the next election period and will try to 
add further members to their ranks. 
If we can trust current predictions, the 
two camps will compete throughout the 
parliamentary term about which one will 
become the largest EU-sceptical group: the 
softer eurosceptic – but rather constructive 
– ECR, or the right-wing populist faction 
around actors such as Salvini and Le Pen. 
The extent of fragmentation in the EU-
sceptical camp will not only determine how 
much influence its supporters can exert on 
the replacement of the Commission Presi-
dent and the European Council President. 
It will also be crucial to what extent EU-
sceptical parties and MEPs can shape policy 
areas such as migration policy. 
How united or disunited the EU sceptics 
are will also have fundamental consequences 
for the future interactions between European 
institutions. If the eurosceptic and right-
wing populist forces in the EP strengthen, 
doubts will grow as to whether Parliament 
can continue to be regarded as a reliable 
engine of the European integration process. 
Majorities for federal reform processes will 
be even more difficult to find in the next 
parliamentary term than before. 
Regarding the overall integration pro-
cess, it appears that the forthcoming Euro-
pean elections could be a step towards a 
fundamental reorientation of the European 
integration project. After years of crisis, the 
election campaigns will focus primarily on 
the EU’s self-perception. With the defeat 
of Marine Le Pen in the French presidential 
elections of 2017, many parties – includ-
ing those that are fundamentally sceptical 
about the EU – have decided to no longer 
question the EU itself or the membership 
of their respective country. Instead, they are 
now calling for fundamental changes to the 
EU’s value base. Among the many political 
challenges, the question of whether Euro-
pean integration will continue to follow a 
cosmopolitan ideal or whether it will turn 
towards a course of isolation is therefore 
becoming more and more pressing. 
Dr Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the EU / Europe Division at SWP,  
Felix Schenuit is Research Assistant of the EU / Europe Division at SWP. 
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